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Abstract The determination of death by neurological criteria remains controversial
scientifically, culturally, and legally, worldwide. In the United Kingdom, although
the determination of death by neurological criteria is not legally codified, the Code
of Practice of the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges is customarily used for
neurological (brainstem) death determination and treatment withdrawal. Unlike
some states in the US, however, there are no provisions under the law requiring
accommodation of and respect for residents’ religious rights and commitments
when secular conceptions of death based on medical codes and practices conflict
with a traditional concept well-grounded in religious and cultural values and
practices. In this article, we analyse the medical, ethical, and legal issues that were
generated by the recent judgement of the High Court of England and Wales in Re: A
(A Child) [2015] EWHC 443 (Fam). Mechanical ventilation was withdrawn in this
case despite parental religious objection to a determination of death based on the
code of practice. We outline contemporary evidence that has refuted the reliability
of tests of brainstem function to ascertain the two conjunctive clinical criteria for the
determination of death that are stipulated in the code of practice: irreversible loss of
capacity for consciousness and somatic integration of bodily biological functions.
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We argue that: (1) the tests of brainstem function were not properly undertaken in
this case; (2) the two conjunctive clinical criteria set forth in the code of practice
cannot be reliably confirmed by these tests in any event; and (3) absent authenti-
cation of the clinical criteria of death, the code of practice (in fact, although
implicitly rather than explicitly) wrongly invokes a secular definition of death based
on the loss of personhood. Consequently, the moral obligation of a pluralistic
society to honor and respect diverse religious convictions to the greatest extent
possible is being violated. Re A (A Child) is contrasted with the US case of Jahi
McMath in which the court accommodated parental religious objection to the
determination of neurological death codified in the Uniform Determination of Death
Act. We conclude that the legal system in the United Kingdom should not favour a
secular definition of death over a definition of death that is respectful of religious
values about the inviolability and sanctity of life. We recommend the legal
recognition of religious accommodation in death determination to facilitate cultural
sensitivity and compassionate care to patients and families in a pluralistic society.
Keywords Brainstem death  Code of practice  Determination of death  Disorders
of consciousness  Law  Life-support treatment  Neuroscience  Religious ethics
Introduction
Brain death or the determination of death by neurological criteria remains
controversial scientifically, culturally, and legally, worldwide (Bernat 2015). There
is no uniform neurological standard in death determination because of the variability
in practices and perceptions of the global medical community about brain death
(Wahlster et al. 2015). The neurological determination of death varies among
countries with regard to the use of whole brain criteria or brainstem criteria, and the
mandatory performance of confirmatory tests (Ding et al. 2015; Citerio and Murphy
2015; Chua et al. 2015; Varelas 2016; Cameron et al. 2016). Confirmatory tests
include neuroimaging of cerebral blood flow and electrophysiological studies of the
cerebral hemispheres and the brainstem.
In the United Kingdom (UK), neurological death is determined by performing a
particular set of tests for brainstem function (Table 1). These are in accordance
with, and outlined in, the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges’ ‘‘Code of Practice
for the Diagnosis and Confirmation of Death’’ which was first issued in 1976 and
subsequently updated (The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges 2008). Although
there is, to date, no legislation which confirms the legitimacy of the code of practice,
courts have consistently endorsed it in the determination of legal death (R v.
Malcherek and R v. Steel 1981; Re A (A Minor) 1992). The judicial system has
always assumed that properly undertaken tests of brainstem function can reliably
confirm the two conjunctive clinical criteria of death (clinical death) set forth in the
code of practice: irreversible loss of capacity for consciousness and somatic
integration of bodily biological functions. Ipso facto, all life-support treatment,
including mechanical ventilation, can legally be withdrawn once brainstem death is
determined.
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This approach was recently challenged in Re: A (A Child) [2015] EWHC 443
(Fam). In this heart-rending and tragic case, the Muslim parents of a brainstem dead
child opposed the switching off of his mechanical ventilator on grounds of religious
objection to a determination of death based on the code of practice. The High Court
of England and Wales dismissed their challenge to death determination as coming
from distraught parents who were unable to accept the death of their child. It went
on to permit the immediate non-consensual withdrawal of the child’s life-support
treatment including mechanical ventilation. In choosing not to engage with the
arguments the parents put forward in furtherance of their religious observance of the
Islamic faith, the court seemed to have given short shrift to their plea for dissension
from the secular and scientific code.
We argue in this article that this is potentially a problematic stance. From a
medical perspective, we highlight two challenging questions in Child A’s case: one,
was the code of practice applied at the appropriate time after acute hypoxic–
ischemic brain injury; and two, is the code of practice used in the determination of
death scientifically valid and thus, arguably, authoritative? In answering both these
questions in the negative, we argue that the judiciary should have exercised more
caution in endorsing the application of the code in the determination of death.
Further and more importantly, it should have made some effort towards
accommodating and respecting residents’ religious rights and commitments when
secular conceptions of death based on medical codes and practices conflict with a
traditional concept well-grounded in religious and cultural values and practices.
Table 1 The criteria for diagnosis of brainstem death
Eligibility criteria Reversible confounding factorsa Tests of brainstem function
(reflexes) in brainstem death
Unresponsiveness to
external stimuli (coma)
Dependency on
mechanical ventilation
Known cause of
unresponsiveness or
presence of structural
brain injury
Period of observation
Residual pharmacological effects
e.g., sedatives, opioids, general
anesthesia, neuro-muscular
blockers
Thermoregulatory disturbances
Endocrine abnormalities
Metabolic derangements
No pupillary response to light
No corneal reflex
No vestibule-ocular reflex (Caloric
test)
No Ocular-cephalic reflex (Doll’s
eye)
No motor response to pain—in the
trigeminal nerve distribution
No gag reflex in response to suction
through endotracheal tube or
tracheostomy
Apnea persists despite a rise in
PaCO2 to greater than 50 mmHg
(6.6 kPa) against a background of
a normal PaO2
Adapted from the source: ‘‘A code of practice for the diagnosis and confirmation of death. A report of the
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges’’ (The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges 2008)
a Confounding factors are clinical conditions that can reversibly suppress brainstem function and result in
an erroneous diagnosis of brainstem death. Failure to recognize the presence of confounding factors and a
false-positive brainstem death determination can result in premature termination of life-support treatment
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We begin the discussion by analysing the facts of the case and the judgment
delivered by Mr. Justice Hayden (see the Supplementary File). We then provide a
critique of the approach taken in the case from medical and ethical perspectives. For
comparative analysis, we refer to the United States’ (US) practices. We conclude
with recommendations that can enhance religious and cultural sensitivity in life-
ending medical decision-making in a pluralistic society like the UK.
Re A (A Child): A Missed Opportunity?
Child A, who was 19 months old, choked on a tiny piece of fruit on the 6th of
February 2015 and was immediately taken to the Central Manchester University
Hospital (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 3). On arrival at the hospital, he was in severe
respiratory distress and soon went into cardiac arrest at 15.11 h. In addition to
receiving CPR and being intubated, he was operated on to remove the foreign
object. He was successfully resuscitated from cardiac arrest at 15.31 h and
transferred to pediatric intensive care where he continued to be heavily sedated and
mechanically-ventilated. A neuro-protective regime was initiated (Re: A (A Child)
2015, para 5). Brainstem tests were performed at 10.10 a.m. and 5.30 p.m. on the
10th of February 2015 and indicated death by brainstem criteria (Re: A (A Child)
2015, para 1). Medical staff concluded that mechanical ventilation should be
discontinued because the child was clinically and legally dead in line with the code
of practice and established case law.
The coroner, who was also informed of the development, wrote to the hospital
Trust’s clinical director when the mechanical ventilator was not discontinued 2 days
after brainstem death determination, stating that:
Technically, I have assumed jurisdiction over the body. It seems wholly
inappropriate for a deceased body to be intubated and ventilated when this is
futile and, to my mind, unethical. Accordingly, I must ask you to cease this
and extubate him so that his body can be moved to the mortuary from which it
can be released to his parents (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 19).
The delay in withdrawing mechanical ventilation was precipitated by Child A’s
parents’ refusal to accept brainstem death as synonymous with death in the Islamic
faith. The signs that distinguish between life and death are well-described in the
Islamic scriptures (Rady and Verheijde 2016c). From a religious viewpoint, death is
demarcated by the soul’s departure from the body. The soul’s presence is associated
with the continuation of a beating heart and the perpetuation of breathing, even if
aided by artificial ventilation (Bedir and Aksoy 2011, pp. 290–291), as was the case
with Child A; consequently, this person is still considered alive.
Because of the disagreement between the parents and the medical staff and coroner
on death determination, the hospital sought a declaration from the High Court to
discontinue life-support treatment, including mechanical ventilation. In granting this
declaration, Mr. Justice Hayden re-confirmed the stance taken in earlier case law: that
a person on mechanical ventilation is legally dead when brainstem death has been
confirmed. Child A was declared to have died at 10.10 a.m. on the 10th of February
HEC Forum
123
2015 (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 1). AlthoughMr. Justice Hayden acknowledged that
‘‘in a multi-cultural society there has to be recognition that people, particularly those
with strong religious beliefs, may differ with medical professional as to when death
occurs’’ (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 24), it was remarked that Child A’s parents’
objection was rooted not just in their Muslim beliefs, but also in their ‘‘basic parental
instinct’’ (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 10). The parents had, he observed, ‘‘simply been
unable to contemplate turning off ventilator support,’’ and desperately therefore
‘‘[clung] on to any sign that may undermine these catastrophic medical conclusions’’
(Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 17) and ‘‘cleave[d] to what thread of life [they perceived
their] son still to have’’ (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 7).
The High Court also refused to consider the parents’ alternative request for the
continuation of mechanical ventilation until the child is repatriated to Saudi Arabia
since they were Saudi citizens (the child’s father was studying for a PhD in the UK).
By allowing the continuation of mechanical ventilation, the parents could have had
enough time to arrange the transfer of Child A to a medical facility in Saudi Arabia,
where medical treatment would be continued (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 18).
Instead, Mr. Justice Hayden authorized the immediate discontinuation of mechan-
ical ventilation in what he had already considered to be a corpse on a ventilator (Re:
A (A Child) 2015, para 14).
Nevertheless, a small concession was made when he emphasized that where
discordant views arise in the future between the medical staff and the patient’s
family about continuation of assisted mechanical ventilation, the dispute should be
determined in the High Court rather than under coronial powers (Re: A (A Child)
2015, para 27). Minimally, this gives the patient’s ambivalent ‘‘dead or alive’’ status
the benefit of the doubt.
Given the unique facts above, this case seems to be the first brought to the British
courts where the objection to the prevailing definition of death was registered on the
grounds of religion in general and the Islamic faith in particular. By refusing to engage
with the challenges mounted against the universal applicability of the code, the ruling
may have represented a missed opportunity to develop an ethically-robust and
religiously-sensitive approach to the determination of death in the UK. The ensuing
discussion will explore the medical and ethical challenges surrounding this case.
A Medico-Ethical Critique
The Medical Perspective
Reflecting on the medical facts of Re A (A Child), there are two issues that warrant
close examination. First, was the medical evidence presented to Mr. Justice Hayden
sufficient to ensure that the code of practice was applied in Child A at the
appropriate time after acute hypoxic–ischemic brain injury, and therefore to warrant
a finding of neurological (brainstem) death under the code of practice? The medical
evidence provided to the Court consisted of neurological death determination by
brainstem criteria as stipulated in the code of practice, which included the 1991
report of the British Pediatric Association on the diagnosis of brainstem death in
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infants and children. Second, is the code of practice, even when applied
appropriately, valid proof of ‘‘clinical death’’?
Neurological (brainstem) death was determined by ‘‘simple bedside tests’’ of
brainstem function (Table 1) (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 9). As presented to Mr.
Justice Hayden by Dr. Playfor (the consultant pediatric intensivist responsible for
Child A), ‘‘[t]he key point…is that no patient has ever regained consciousness or
awareness following brain stem death’’ (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 11). In
addressing the first question (was the medical evidence sufficient to discontinue life-
support treatment, at that particular time, after hypoxic–ischemic brain injury?) it
should be noted that Child A was started on a treatment plan with a ‘‘neuro-
protective regime’’ and was also ‘‘heavily sedated’’ (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 5).
Brainstem tests were performed at 91 h and repeated again at 98 h after
resuscitation from cardiac arrest. Reversible suppression of brainstem reflexes can
persist longer than 98 h after neuro-protective therapy has been initiated and
influence the accuracy of neurological death determination (Webb and Samuels
2011). Recovery of ceased neurological functions can be delayed as long as 278 h
after discontinuing sedative drugs and neuro-protective therapy (targeted temper-
ature management) (Paul et al. 2016). Therefore, a minimum waiting time of no less
than 120 h has been recommended before determining the irreversibility of
hypoxic–ischemic brain injury (Ponz et al. 2016). If reversible suppression of
brainstem reflexes is mistaken as irreversible cessation of brainstem function,
neurological death is determined incorrectly (Joffe et al. 2009; Webb and Samuels
2011). Furthermore, the timeline of recovery of higher brain functions and
consciousness (awakening) after neuro-protective therapy can be delayed up to
2 weeks following hypoxic–ischemic brain injury (Gold et al. 2014).
The code of practice does not require performing confirmatory tests (absence of
cerebral blood flow, electric silence on electroencephalography, and/or absence of
evoked potentials) in the determination of neurological death except under
exceptional conditions, such as when the clinical examination of brainstem function
is not possible or deemed unreliable because of confounding factors (The Academy
of Medical Royal Colleges 2008). Confounding factors (Table 1) are clinical
conditions that can potentially suppress brainstem reflexes, but are reversible.
Therefore, brainstem function could recover with time. Not all confounding factors
are accurately recognized in clinical practice. The most common confounding
factors are persistent pharmacological effects of sedatives, opioids, anesthetic drugs,
neuromuscular-blocking drugs, or metabolic derangements (Cameron et al. 2016).
Pharmacological effects of heavy sedation as well as thermoregulatory and
metabolic derangements were potential confounding factors present in Child A (Re:
A (A Child) 2015, para 5 and para 16). When Child A’s father noticed the presence
of ‘‘twitching and retraction of Child A’s legs’’, the medical staff dismissed these
movements as ‘‘spinal, not cerebral reactions’’ and proceeded with brainstem death
determination (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 17). The code of practice has broadly
assumed that limb movements are ‘‘independent of the brain and controlled through
the spinal cord’’ (The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges 2008, p. 11). However,
movements in lower extremities were also noted in cases of incorrect brain death
determination (Morales 2008). These movements could be mediated by the
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brainstem and do not necessarily originate from the spinal cord alone and, thus,
should have stopped clinicians from proceeding with brainstem tests to determine
neurological death (Joffe and Anton 2007). As a note of caution, at autopsy, the
brainstem was reported as normal or minimally ischemic in about 60 % of patients
who were determined brain dead by clinical examination only (Wijdicks and Pfeifer
2008).
Child A was determined brainstem dead after repeating the required tests at a 7-h
interval. Failure to perform at least two confirmatory tests and to repeat both the
clinical examination and confirmatory tests at a minimum of 12 h-interval has been
reported to increase the likelihood of brain-death diagnosis by 370 % (Ding et al.
2015). Failure to comply with these safeguards can increase the diagnostic error rate
and the rate of false positive determination of neurological death. Reliance on
clinical examination alone can also result in an erroneous determination of
neurological death if medical staff fail to recognize the presence of potential
confounding factors (Joffe et al. 2010). Such instances have been reported in several
cases in which patients regained some of the ceased functions of the brainstem or
made a complete neurological recovery after being determined dead by neurological
criteria (Morales 2008; Joffe et al. 2009; Marik and Varon 2010; Roberts et al. 2010;
Webb and Samuels 2011; Sullivan et al. 2012). Incorrect determination of brainstem
death therefore has a lethal consequence because it results in the premature
withdrawal of life-support treatment.
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) was obtained 24 h after the acute hypoxic–
ischemic injury of Child A’s brain. The MRI predictably ‘‘revealed extensive severe
ischemic changes involving the grey matter of Child A’s brain [and] that the brain
injury was so extensive that it was something from which it was impossible for
Child A to survive’’ (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 6). However, the MRI in these
cases produces static images of the higher brain structures including the cerebral
cortex. It does not measure either the retained activity or function of cerebral
neurons. Is it then reasonable to raise the question whether the medical evidence
was sufficient to conclude that Child A cannot recover higher brain functions? How
reliable was the presence of extensive ischemic changes of the cerebral cortex on a
brain MRI in predicting the potential for neurological recovery? Contemporary
medical evidence has suggested that neuroimaging cannot reliably predict the
neurological outcome in cardiac arrest survivors with hypoxic–ischemic brain injury
(Hahn et al. 2014). This is most relevant in infants and children. The developing
infant brain has a greater plasticity compared to an adult brain and is more likely to
achieve better neurological recovery after extensive ischemic injury on
neuroimaging.
Regarding the second question (Is the code of practice, when applied
appropriately, valid proof of ‘‘clinical death’’?), the code of practice has equated
brainstem death with clinical death because of the fulfilment of two conjunctive
clinical criteria:
[c]oncern is sometimes expressed over continuing function within the
brainstem, occurring beneath the level at which any motor, somatosensory
or breathing reflexes can be elicited and also over continuing function in other
HEC Forum
123
parts of the brain. However, as has already been indicated, both are irrelevant
when evaluating function against these clinical criteria of death resulting from
irreversible cessation of brain-stem function, which demonstrate the perma-
nent absence of consciousness and thus the ability to feel or do anything,
along with the inevitable and rapid deterioration of integrated biological
function [emphasis added] (The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges 2008,
p. 17).
Firstly, the code of practice assumes that the diagnosis of brainstem death is
equivalent to clinical death because of an irreversible loss of the capacity for
consciousness. Many clinicians in the UK have presented this assumption in
medical literature as a confirmed fact when there is no supportive neuroscientific
evidence (Cameron et al. 2016). As previously highlighted, Mr. Justice Hayden was
told ‘‘that no patient has ever regained consciousness or awareness following brain
stem death’’ (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 11). But did absent brainstem function
(reflexes) confirm the absence of capacity for regaining consciousness or
awareness? Rapidly progressing neuroscience has improved the understanding of
the neurophysiology of human consciousness and the clinical spectrum of disorders
of consciousness (Zeman 2001). Functional neuroanatomy of human consciousness
is far more complex than previously appreciated and depicted in the code of practice
(Di Perri et al. 2014). Neuroscientific research has refuted the assumption that the
locus of human consciousness lies exclusively in the brainstem (Rady and Verheijde
2016a). Functional neuroimaging has identified distinctive neural networks that
mediate self-awareness and environmental awareness in the severely injured human
brain (Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2011; Di Perri et al. 2014; Gosseries et al. 2014).
Additionally, as mentioned previously, 60 % of patients who are neurologically
determined dead by absent function (reflexes) have a normal or minimally ischemic
brainstem at autopsy (Wijdicks and Pfeifer 2008). Absence of brainstem reflexes
does not necessarily equate with, nor confirm the absence of, capacity for
consciousness or awareness (Peterson et al. 2014). Currently, there are no simple
tests that can reliably verify the irreversible loss of capacity for consciousness or
awareness in the severely injured human brain (Gosseries et al. 2014; Lutkenhoff
et al. 2015). This is clearly illustrated by the ‘‘locked-in-syndrome’’ in which
complete dependency on mechanical ventilation is necessary because of the loss of
brainstem function, but the patient can still retain awareness of the surrounding
environment and the self (Charland-Verville et al. 2015). The code of practice has
not scientifically verified the neuroanatomical locus of consciousness, nor validated
the tests of brainstem function as reliable indicators of irreversible loss of the
capacity for consciousness or awareness. Secondly, the code of practice has
indicated that ‘‘even if the body of the deceased [brainstem dead] remains on
respiratory support, the loss of integrated biological function will inevitably lead to
deterioration and organ necrosis within a short time’’ [emphasis added] (The
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges 2008, p. 11). This claim was disproven almost
two decades ago. Clinical data have demonstrated prolonged survival of brainstem
dead patients with only mechanical ventilation and nutrition for as long as 14 years
(Shewmon 1998a, b, 1999, 2001). Cumulative scientific evidence has refuted the
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assertion that brainstem death is associated with an irreversible disintegration of
somatic biological functions or organ necrosis within a short time.
To summarize, the cessation of brainstem function (reflexes) in Child A did not
imply irreversible loss of either capacity for consciousness or somatic integration of
biological functions and failed to confirm the clinical criteria of death that are
stipulated in the code of practice (The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges 2008,
p. 17). We conclude by contending that the medical evidence presented was
insufficient to apply the code of practice to determine brainstem death and to
terminate life-support treatment at that particular time after acute hypoxic–ischemic
brain injury in Child A. Also, had the code of practice been applied at the
appropriate time after hypoxic–ischemic brain injury, the code itself would still
have failed to verify the ‘‘clinical death’’ of Child A.
Ethical and Societal Considerations
Good practice of medicine entails adherence to certain ethical principles. Child A’s
case underscores the relevance of the ‘‘do no harm’’ principle in life-ending medical
decisions in the ICU. The clinical uncertainty in neuro-prognosis and diagnosis
should have been sufficient for a pause before proceeding with terminal withdrawal
of life-support treatment. An avoidable loss of life can result if the medical decision
is prematurely made to withdraw therapeutic interventions or beneficial treatment
when there is a level of uncertainty that goes beyond what is generally understood to
be clinically acceptable. It is difficult to prognose the neurological outcome or the
future quality of a child’s life early after hypoxic–ischemic brain injury. Several
studies (Gold et al. 2014; Ponz et al. 2016) have cautioned against an early
withdrawal of life-support because of serious errors in prediction of a neurological
prognosis after acute hypoxic–ischemic brain injury.
Some clinicians have nevertheless imposed their personal normative values on
others based on their normative stance that survival with severe neurological
disabilities is a worse outcome than death and that the continuation of life-support
treatment is tantamount to ‘‘torture’’, ‘‘inhumane’’, ‘‘punishment’’, or ‘‘degrading
treatment’’ (Brierley et al. 2013). However, if life-support treatment is truly
universally harmful and causative of unmanageable pain and suffering, then the
critical care medicine practice and pediatric ICUs would not have grown globally
over the past decades. On the contrary, premature discontinuation of therapeutically
effective intervention or beneficial treatment is likely to cause distress and even
death. The benefit of continuing life and avoiding premature death can outweigh the
burden of treatment. Withdrawing mechanical ventilator support can result in acute
asphyxia and distress which is generally difficult to detect and palliate in severe
brain injuries (Rady and Verheijde 2016b).
Good medical care is multidimensional and requires attention to physical aspects,
as well as emotional, spiritual, and social aspects of illness. These are essential
components in patient-centered and family-centered medical care. Cultural com-
petence and sensitivity of the medical staff are also the hallmarks of providing
compassionate care to patients and families, especially in the presence of a
potentially catastrophic and fatal illness (Larcher et al. 2015). The divergence of
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moral values and beliefs, as well as the imbalance in authority and power between
healthcare teams and families, often result in conflict and adversarial confrontation:
A family’s concept of their child’s best interests is likely to be determined by
their own system of values. A number of influences shape a family’s collective
value systems; these include religious beliefs, political and cultural attitudes
and life experiences. Parental values may not coincide with those of
professionals. Disagreements may be aggravated by the power imbalance
inherent in the healthcare professional/patient, child/parent relationship
(Larcher et al. 2015, p. S11).
Therefore, the Royal College of Pediatrics and Child Health has cautioned
against disregarding cultural diversity when making clinical decisions about
forgoing treatment in children:
The UK Census… has confirmed that 1 in 10 children are classed as from
minority ethnic groups and therefore decisions on limitation of treatment need
to be underpinned by an understanding of cultural ‘diversity’. This remains a
relatively under-researched area, but is important in the face of increasing
cultural diversity in the UK (Larcher et al. 2015, p. S21).
Patients and families are vulnerable for several reasons. Firstly, they do not
realize there is a wide variability among ICU clinicians in the decision-making
about forgoing life-support treatment at the end of life (Sprung et al. 2015).
Secondly, patients and families have limited or no ability to choose ICU clinicians
who share or respect their values, which would mitigate the risk of variability in
end-of-life decisions making (Zivot 2012). Thirdly, families are not generally
informed about how death is defined and according to which criteria it is determined
in British ICUs. The code of practice considers the absence of consciousness as the
defining feature of death: ‘‘irreversible loss of those essential characteristics which
are necessary to the existence of a living human person and, thus, the definition of
death should be regarded as the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness’’
[emphasis added] (The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges 2008, p. 11). Fourthly,
families are not informed that the presence or absence of consciousness cannot be
reliably verified by current brainstem tests. Finally, clinicians who incorrectly claim
that neurological (brainstem) death perfectly equates to biological death can cause
families to distrust the healthcare team.
In the US, the President’s Council on Bioethics (2008) refuted the equivalency of
neurological (whole brain) death with biological death in the ‘‘Controversies in the
Determination of Death: A White Paper by the President’s Council on Bioethics’’.
Somatic integration and most of the bodily biological functions that are
characteristic of living humans are preserved in neurological death, but not in
biological death (The President’s Council on Bioethics 2008, p. 56). To salvage the
equivalency of neurological death with human death, a philosophical definition of
death was proposed. The determination of life or death in a whole organism, the
President’s Council argued, is dependent upon the organism’s ability to perform
fundamental vital work, i.e., to commerce with the surrounding world:
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Determining whether an organism remains a whole depends on recognizing
the persistence or cessation of the fundamental vital work of a living
organism—the work of self-preservation, achieved through the organism’s
need driven commerce with the surrounding world (The President’s Council
on Bioethics 2008, p. 60).
In the context of death determination, the President’s Council limited the vital
work of a living whole organism only to the capacity for consciousness and
spontaneous breathing. If the whole organism has irreversibly lost the capacity for
consciousness and spontaneous breathing, it cannot commerce with the surrounding
world and should, therefore, be considered dead regardless of preservation of
somatic integration. This philosophical redefinition of life and death has been
criticized because of inherent biological and logical inconsistencies that result in
erroneous (false positive) death determination in clinical practice (Shewmon 2009).
Meanwhile, the UK code of practice for neurological (brainstem) death
determination has always required only cessation of the functions of the brainstem
instead of the entire or whole brain (which includes the higher brain structures as
well as the brainstem) (The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges 2008). We have
argued that the tests of brainstem function, even if properly undertaken, cannot
reliably confirm the two conjunctive clinical criteria of death set forth in the code of
practice (loss of capacity for consciousness and loss of somatic integration of bodily
biological functions). The President’s Council on Bioethics also emphasized the
potential dangerous consequences of false positive or faulty death determination in
only:
accepting ‘death of the brainstem’ rather than total brain failure, as a sufficient
criterion for declaring a patient dead. Such a reduction, in addition to being
conceptually suspect, is clinically dangerous because it suggests that the
confirmatory tests that go beyond the bedside checks for apnea and brainstem
reflexes are simply superfluous [emphasis added] (The President’s Council on
Bioethics 2008, p. 66).
Pallis, a British neurologist and the founder of the brainstem death concept in the
code of practice, believed that the capacity for consciousness and spontaneous
breathing are a ‘‘sociological context for basic concepts of life and death… and …
two definitive features of the human soul’’ (The President’s Council on Bioethics
2008, p. 65). Pallis interpreted that the brainstem was the locus of human soul and
that in brainstem death the human soul departed from the physical body: ‘‘[t]he
formulation is, in my opinion, merely a secularized restatement (in the language of
modern neurophysiology) of such age-old notions as the ‘departure of the (con-
scious) soul from the body’ and the ‘loss of the breath of life’’’ (Pallis 1995, p. 20).
In response to his critics, Pallis stated ‘‘[r]est assured moreover that the concept of
brainstem death has a solid philosophical basis: one that would certainly be
consonant with your notion of ‘loss of personal identity’’’ (Pallis 1995, p. 22). The
code of practice has implicitly invoked a philosophical definition of death and, with
that, a presumed sequence in determining death: loss of capacity for consciousness
(and spontaneous breathing) = neurological death = departure of the ‘soul’ and/or
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loss of personal identity = human death. However, by unilaterally invoking a
value-laden construct of death, the neurological criteria of death determination have
been adopted without any national dialogue or public involvement. The code of
practice has wrongly authorized a secular construct of death based on: (1) a
mischaracterized broad societal acceptance of consciousness and spontaneous
breathing as the dividing line between life and death, (2) a misaligned Pallis’
interpretation of the locus of the human ‘soul’ and the time of its departure from the
body, and, (3) an unsubstantiated claim of the subsequent loss of personal identity.
Consequently, the moral obligation of a pluralistic society to honor and respect
diverse religious convictions to the greatest extent possible is being violated.
When the medical construct of brainstem death was endorsed in Child A, just as it
was in previous British cases, the court either inadvertently or consciously chose to
allow one value-based definition of death (i.e., a secular viewpoint which focuses on a
philosophical definition of loss of personhood) to dominate over another equally-
respected and respectable value-based system (i.e., a religious viewpoint which
focuses on biological definition and sanctity of life). This has the potential to deprive
residents of their constitutional rights and transgress diverse cultural and religious
value systems in a pluralistic society (Biggar 2015). Child A’s case raises the question
of whether it is appropriate that a decision which holds such monumental societal
implications should be decided retrospectively by the judicial process rather than
prospectively through the legislative process. It is worth mentioning that the courts
have repeatedly refused to rule on whether the law should allow physician-assisted
suicide, preferring for Parliament to undertake this task instead (R (on the application
of Nicklinson and another) vMinistry of Justice 2014)). It is surprising that the judicial
system has not embraced a similarly guarded position on rulings about legal death
determination despite the far more serious repercussions involved. After all, the legal
determination of death assumes an extremely important social boundary (Magnus
et al. 2014, p. 894). The status of dead or alive signifies whether an individual should
still be recognized as a person with constitutional rights; when his last will and
testament become effective and his estate will devolve; and when his remains can be
buried or cremated (Magnus et al. 2014; Shaw 2014). More importantly in the clinical
context, it signifies the point beyond which healthcare professionals are no longer
under a duty to provide medical treatment to the patient, and indicates when life-
support treatment can be discontinued.
The construct of brainstem death also enables the procurement of trans-
plantable vital organs from heart-beating donors before biological death (Shah 2014,
p. 106; Larcher et al. 2015; Rady and Verheijde 2016c). A brainstem dead child is a
potential donor of vital organs, and mechanical ventilation and medical treatment
would be continued until the removal of organs:
I [Mr. Justice Hayden] cannot conceive of any circumstances in which the
Coroner should seek to intervene, where a body remains ventilated, beyond
those circumstances concerning the removal of organs where the family are
consenting (Re: A (A Child) 2015, para 22).
Although organ donation was not a consideration in Child A, Brierley and
Larcher have called for major legal, ethical, and cultural changes in the UK society
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to overcome the end-of-life barriers to pediatric organ donation: ‘‘[u]nlike the UK,
the USA, Australia, Canada and many European countries accept the concept of
brain death in infants and concomitant certification that can lead to DBD [donation
after brain death]’’ [emphasis added] (Brierley and Larcher 2011, p. 1176). Brierley
has also advocated for elective initiation and continuation of mechanical ventilation
in eligible neonates and infants to maximize organ donation and transplantation in
the UK (Jivraj et al. 2016).
If the legal system is supportive of a medical definition of death with a specific
dominant philosophical underpinning intended to serve the interests of specific
subgroups of clinicians, this should raise several concerns. Is the judiciary assuming
joint legislative roles with the medical profession in favoring a death determination
which facilitates pediatric organ donation? If so, should there not be more
transparency by clarifying this point in the judgment so that the public are
sufficiently informed of the ramifications of the judicial standpoint? Otherwise, not
only is organ procurement operating in an opaque manner, the recognition of only a
single definition of death also undermines respect for religious freedom. This is
enshrined in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ‘‘[e]veryone
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes the
freedom to…manifest his religion or belief, in…practice and observance’’
(European Convention on Human Rights 1950). The latter is particularly marked
when Mr. Justice Hayden refused to accommodate Child A’s parents’ religious
viewpoint that brainstem death does not equate to death in Islam. The High Court’s
decision sends a reverberating message that the definition of death proffered by the
medical profession applies without exception to faith communities. So resolute and
uncompromising was this stance that Mr. Justice Hayden refused, as highlighted, to
accommodate even the parents’ alternative request to continue mechanical
ventilation in Child A until arrangements were made for air medical transportation
to Saudi Arabia. This informs us that the acceptance of the medical definition of
death is so total and unreserved that no allowance is made even for citizens of other
countries who have a different concept of when death occurs. This decision also
implies that British Muslims or Jews, for example, who object to brainstem death
determination will not be allowed continuation of mechanical ventilation so that
arrangements can be made for transferring to an alternative medical facility or to
another country like Saudi Arabia or Israel.
A Comparative Perspective
The judicial ruling in Child A contrasts sharply with the US approach in the case of
Jahi McMath (Winkfield v. Childrens Hospital Oakland (2013)). Jahi, who was
13 years old when she underwent a surgical procedure in 2013 to correct sleep
apnea, was declared brain dead when post-operative complications resulted in
hypoxic–ischemic brain injury. When doctors at the Oakland Children’s Hospital in
California attempted to withdraw mechanical ventilation, the family similarly
objected to this decision based on religious grounds (Johnson 2016). Jahi’s parents
argued that from their Christian faith perspective, death occurs when the heart stops
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beating and that Jahi was still alive as her heart was still beating spontaneously. The
McMath family petitioned the court to prevent the hospital from withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment. Ruling in favor of Jahi’s doctors, Judge Evelio Grillo
pronounced her dead under California Law. This was in accordance with
California’s Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) which states that
‘‘[a]n individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all function of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead’’ (Uniform Determination of Death Act
1981). What was particularly noteworthy about the judgement, however, was how
the judge allowed Jahi’s ventilated ‘‘dead body’’ to be handed over to the coroner
through an elaborate legal charade, to mark that she was indeed dead in the eyes of
California law. The coroner then issued a death certificate and handed Jahi, still on
mechanical ventilation, back to her family. This was not for the usual purpose of
burial or cremation, but so that she could then be transported to an undisclosed
medical facility in New Jersey which was willing to continue life-sustaining
treatment. Jahi, in the process, was treated not as a patient nor a dead body since
‘‘living patients are not sent to the morgue, and dead bodies are not actively
ventilated’’ (Johnson 2014, p. 36). The judgement was consistent with Sec-
tion 1254.4 of the California Health and Safety Code which instructs that if:
the patient’s legally recognized health care decision-maker, family or next of
kin voices any special religious or cultural practices and concerns of the
patient or the patient’s family surrounding the issue of death by reason of
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain of the patient, the
hospital shall make reasonable efforts to accommodate those religious and
cultural practices and concerns [emphasis added] (Nguyen 2015, p. 408).
It is noteworthy that although the McMath family’s exercise of religious beliefs
was burdened by the absence of a religious exception in California’s UDDA, the
request for transferring Jahi to an alternative medical facility was facilitated (Luce
2015, p. 1149). Jahi was transferred to a medical facility in New Jersey where the
law allows patients and families to reject brain-based determination of death. In
fact, the law proscribed a declaration of death being made on the basis of
neurological criteria where ‘‘such a declaration would violate the personal religious
beliefs of the individual’’ (New Jersey Declaration of Death Act 1991). In such a
circumstance, death is to be declared only on the basis of cardio-respiratory criteria.
Although the US has not yet gone so far as to have a religious exception recognized
in all states (Delaney 2010), the fact that it is recognized in New Jersey allowed the
court to exercise some degree of flexibility when it facilitated the transport of Jahi
on mechanical ventilation to another medical facility (Lewis et al. 2016).
It is curious that Mr. Justice Hayden made no reference to the McMath case in
the High Court’s judgement despite the publicity of this case, nor did he give serious
consideration to a similar request to relocate Child A while still ventilated to Saudi
Arabia where the parents claimed that mechanical ventilation would never be
withdrawn in similar circumstances. This raises another question: Why was this
conclusion made with such inexplicable urgency, when it was logistically possible
to repatriate a ventilated Child A to Saudi Arabia? New advances in medical
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technology and critical care delivery have enabled safe air medical transportation of
critically ill patients on mechanical ventilation across continents. This was safely
accomplished when Jahi McMath was transported across North America from the
western state of California to the eastern state of New Jersey. Was the decision in
Child A made solely because of a desire not to be inconsistent with the established
legal position? If so, the High Court could have at least engaged in the same legal
creativity as in the McMath case. Judge Grillo’s decision, far from compromising
Californians’ faith in the court system, demonstrates flexibility and compassion
when dealing with religious objections to brain death. Instead, as observed by
Brierley (2015), a pediatric intensivist at London’s Great Ormond Street Children
Hospital, ‘‘religious control over how death can be verified does not seem to be
lawful in the UK.’’ It appears that the secularist viewpoint in the determination of
death is set to prevail over religious values in the UK. This dominance of the
secularist viewpoint in the UK can be sharply contrasted with the survey findings
that most clinicians in the US would accommodate and respect religious objection
of families to death determination by neurological criteria (Ayeh et al. 2016).
Recommendations
The case of Re A (A Child) came to the attention of the British judiciary
approximately four decades after the medical fraternity in the UK adopted brainstem
death as the determinant of death. Although this definition has still not been put on
statutory footing, the courts have consistently endorsed the code of practice issued
by the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges for the determination of neurological
death. The judgment in the present case highlights not only the extent to which the
judiciary continues to adopt a passive and unquestioning acceptance of the code, but
that it is recognized as the sole determinant of death in British ICUs. As discussed,
these suggest that the High Court was both unconcerned with whether the code was
applied correctly in this case and oblivious to the growing scientific literature which
cast doubt on the reliability of the mechanisms outlined in the code. More
fundamentally, the refusal to consider religious conceptions of death meant that
room is not created for religious dissension from the secular code. In light of these
concerns, several recommendations are outlined below.
We urge against making an irreversible decision about early withdrawal of life-
support treatment after acute hypoxic–ischemic brain injury. Instead, treatment
should be maintained until greater clarity of neuro-prognosis is possible. Scientif-
ically validated tests should be utilized in the determination of neuro-prognosis and
diagnosis since current tests of brainstem function (reflexes) and static neuroimag-
ing studies cannot reliably predict the irreversible loss of capacity for consciousness
or neurological recovery. We also recommend that medical staff should be educated
and trained in cultural sensitivity and communication to reduce the frequency of
conflicts with patients and families with diverse cultural values. In end-of-life
conflicts involving terminal withdrawal of life-support treatment, patients and
families are vulnerable because they have no choice in selecting clinicians who
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share or respect their values. Society should protect these vulnerable individuals and
provide them with a fair and due process in the resolution of intractable conflicts.
We further recommend that the British judiciary and/or legislators accommodate
and respect residents’ religious rights and commitments when secular conceptions
of death based on medical codes and practices conflict with a traditional concept
well-grounded in religious and cultural values and practices. Respecting cultural
values and religious beliefs strengthens the protection of human rights in a
multicultural society.
Neurologically-based (brainstem) death determination invokes a soul-less secular
death definition which should not overrule traditional death definition upholding
religious values and sanctity of life. Secular death definition can support organ
donation and transplantation, but is conditional upon societal trust in the scientific
authenticity of death determination (Rady and Verheijde 2016d). As public distrust
may undermine support for cadaveric donation (Martin et al. 2015), this underlines
the need for public debate and room for the adoption of more than one definition of
death in a multi-religious society like the UK (Choong 2013).
Conclusions
The determination of neurological (brainstem) death does not fulfill the two clinical
criteria of death that are stipulated by the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges in the
code of practice: (1) irreversible loss of capacity for consciousness, and (2) loss of
somatic integration of biological bodily functions. Scientific advances have refuted
the assertion that tests of brainstem function can provide conclusive evidence in the
confirmation of clinical death. The construct of ‘‘brainstem death’’ is philosophically
grounded in the loss of personhood which is a secular definition of death with vested
interests in advancing the organ donation and transplantation practice. The legal
system should not favor a secular definition of death that transgresses deeply
ingrained religious values about the sanctity of life and deprives residents of their
right to fully observe their religious teachings. We urge the legal system to adopt a
more compassionate approach to death determination that is respectful of cultural and
religious belief systems in a pluralistic society like the UK.
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